Author Archive

Comparing Age Ratings and Pears

Friday, December 12th, 2025

The world has a love/hate-relationship to age ratings. In my country – Sweden – cinema age ratings came about in the early 20th Century following mainly aesthetic criticism from what appears to be a loud minority. “Ugly hats” was one objection that may have contributed to instituting the Cinema Bureau – Statens Biografbyrå – which not only age-rated cinema films, but also banned and edited them. Yes, that’s right, the Swedish government removed parts of films as late as 1994. The last film to be cut by censors in Sweden was Martin Scorsese’s Casino. (The torture scene with the head in the vice was considered to graphic for Swedish movie-goers).

Walter Hill’s New York street gang interpretation of the Odyssey – The Warriors – was in 1979 considered so harmful that anyone who showed it to an audience could be sentenced to jail. Fast forward to 2015 when my eldest child participated in a theatre adaptation of this work organised by the municipality. I borrowed the dvd from the public library where it was found under “Children and Youth”. So times changes and so do the horrors that threaten our children. But this is not a post about folk devils and moral panics. It is about self-regulation.

The Swedish Cinema Bureau ended in 2010, some years after its director general Gunnel Arrbäck had resigned in protest that the government censored art. It was replaced by a voluntary system, where film distributors can submit films to get a formal age recommendation. No more bans or edits.

We all recognize rating labels like PG-13 from film trailers and end credits, and this rating system administered by CARA, is meant to help parents determine whether a particular movie is appropriate for their children to watch. No need for the government to step in, the independent Ratings Board formed by current parents who are making viewing decisions for their children. No tax money, no lengthy legal processes, no bans or edits. Freedom of expression intact, parental guidance provided.

In Europe, there was a similar development for video games in 2003 when PEGI, the Pan-European Game Information was installed. This came after pressure from then-Commissioner Viviane Reding in response to concerns about violent content. Resisting temptation to intervene, Reding said the industry should first get a chance to fix its own problem. Self-regulation “with teeth”, as Reding famously put it. PEGI has been in place for more than two decades and expanded far outside of Europe.

CARA and PEGI share some important functions: the ratings are to be clearly displayed in ads and trailers as well as the actual work. The ratings are decided not by the companies but through independent process: for CARA a panel of parents, for PEGI a questionnaire with corresponding scrutiny from independent experts. And: there is legal certainty – through proper procedure complaints can be made and heard. CARA is self-regulation but PEGI can rather be labelled as co-regulation as the ultimate decisions lie with the PEGI council, a body of experts appointed by the member states.

Of note – both CARA and PEGI are specific to their form of expression. It evolved from similar needs but with tailored structures and processes relevant for the specifics of games and film, respectively. It would make no sense to switch them! It would make no sense to slap them onto some other media. They were not copied willy-nilly from somewhere else in some act of desperation.

Self- and co-regulation has advantages over legislation: it is flexible to changes in the market, it is paid for by the industry (not tax-payers), it is stricter than legislation (a court must assume innocence). It needs to be solid and credible, with all the features described above.

I have often thought of something similar as an answer to Big Tech’s problems with its content. What if there was a standard for age ratings of online video? Maybe also other issues could be addressed with the same method: privacy, fake news. In advertising, press standards and many other places, self-regulation is the norm. In fact, I once had this conversation with a former Big Tech employee – why had they not considered self-regulation? The answer was depressing: there was no trust between the companies, they expected the others to stab them in the back at first opportunity.

But earlier this autumn, one Big Tech company actually tried. Hamfistedly. Meta simply copied the PG-13 rating and slapped it onto Instagram. It appears Meta did zero homework. No council of parents. No appeals process. No independent oversight. And of course no checking with the owner of the trademark – did anyone say move fast and break things?

How did it go? Not so well. But nice try Meta. If at first you don’t succeed, dust yourself of and do it right this time. Try not to think of it as damage control. Try to think of it as something that actually brings long-term value to your service. Perhaps even work together with your neighbours? With some effort, you could avoid both lawsuits and regulation. What’s not to like?

Full transparency: this writer has worked with PEGI, testified on PEGI in court in Sweden, advised the Swedish film-industry on the post-censorship age-recommendations, served on the board of the Swedish advertising standards organisation and posted on the topic of self-regulation more than anyone should do in a lifetime.

From Geo-Blocking to Geo-Enabling: A Tool For Growth

Sunday, November 9th, 2025

There is a delicate balance to strike for Europe’s leaders: can the single market flourish together with the cultural diversity that is at the heart of our identity? A question often revisited over the years. In 2017 Netopia’s cartoonist Rodrigo interpreted the discussion with the phrase “So… now what do we watch?” As the European Commission starts a consultation on the Geo-Blocking Regulation, the topic is brought back once again.

The 2018 EU Geo-Blocking Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2018/302) was crafted to remove friction of trade and equalise the buying process for consumers, in particular those trying to buy physical goods cross-border.

For example, a French consumer might have wished to purchase from a German website but was redirected to a local language version or found their French physical address blocked. They might have been blocked entirely based on their IP – which was all in breach of Article 9 of the EU Geo-Blocking Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2018/302).

Once the regulation passed into law, it removed some of the freedom to work with geoblocking. The EU decided to force retailers to accept customers regardless of geography or regardless of local laws on certain products (e.g., age-based restrictions or the like). Retailers were no longer permitted to charge local rates (even if local storage of the goods meant selling in Germany might be more expensive than in France, for that matter).

So consumers in France could purchase a product in Germany without a price premium, compared to the same product in France, (regardless of the running costs faced by the German business!)

However, the seller isn’t required to offer delivery to France or other countries, meaning the customer is tasked with arranging carriage.

The obligation to deliver was excluded from the geo-blocking rules on account of a diverse set of national consumer rights laws (consumer guarantees, after-sales services, different language requirements, labelling rules and safety rules), not to mention tax laws.

The regulation doesn’t apply to services delivering copyright content such as films, tv content or sport  – an exception which has been backed by various studies on maintaining a healthy market place for consumer choice both in terms of content produced (where territoriality plays a key role in raising financing) and in terms of distribution channels offered (cinema, broadcasting, online services) and price points.

Not only sport, film and TV, but financial services, transport, health and telecommunications industries are alsoexempt. Each can then choose to provide local, tailored and individual geo-blocked services.

These exemptions are subject to regular review, on a five yearly basis. In 2020 the EU Commission saw fit to maintain the exemptions. In 2025 there’s a fresh opportunity for review.

The EU market is unlike any other market in the world with 27 member states and 24 main languages.

Geo-Blocking: A Threat to Local Languages?

The European Union’s plan to assess the exemptions from the ban on unjustified geo-blocking, including for film and television services, might seem like a victory for digital freedom and consumer choice, but at what cost to cultural diversity and local languages?  By eroding the bespoke local marketing of content, , the EU risks homogenizingculture, creative content, films and television and thereby stifling creativity, destroying jobs and undermining the very linguistic and cultural diversity it claims to champion

Determining the exact percentage of films released in local languages for each EU country is challenging due to varying data collection methods and the dynamic nature of film production. However, a study analysing European cinema from 2004 to 2014 provided some insights:

Top 6 Languages: Approximately 62% of European films during this period were produced in five major languages:

    • English: 18.3%
    • French: 17.3%
    • German: 10.0%
    • Italian: 8.6%
    • Spanish: 8.1%

Growth Languages: The remaining 38% of films were produced in various other languages, with notable contributions from:

    • Swedish: 3.3%
    • Dutch: 3.2%
    • Polish: 2.5%
    • Czech: 2.5%

Driving European Cultural Diversity

These figures represent production languages and not the percentage of films released in local languages within each individual EU country. These figures don’t count co-productions, distribution practices, and how audience preferences differ from country to country, driving demand (such as the keen interest for Nordic Noir across Europe or French film in Sweden) which drives the prevalence of non-national films across borders.

In total, European films were produced in 164 different languages during this decade.  The smaller languages like Swedish or Finnish over-index, often featuring as over indexing when counted in the cross-border release figures (termed: non-national works). In fact, Works: a report from the European Audiovisual Observatory  –- part of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg – reports that 51 per cent of all works broadcast in the EU in 2023 are of European origin, surpassing US works (40 per cent).

Geo-enabling not only protects local language, it encourages European output!

Mono-Market Bad for Consumers

Film and television and even sports are more than just entertainment; they are a reflection of cultural identity. Floorball in Scandinavia, Hurling or Shinty in Gaelic countries or Polo in Southern Europe – each generates a local demand.

Each European country has its own rich history, traditions, and storytelling styles, shaped by its unique language, sport and experiences. Geo-enabling allows national industries to thrive around these differences. With highly defined audiences, filmmakers can that tell stories that matter. Without it, the industry will face immense pressure to produce and distribute only for a pan-European audience, a one-size fits all, mono-culture resulting in bland, lowest-common-denominator productions that fail to capture the nuances ofeach country, culture, and languages. Instead of supporting bold, original storytelling, the industry will contract, jobs will be lost and audiences left with less – not more choice.

The Danger to Linguistic Diversity

Where smaller language groups must punch above their weight to maintain their presence in mainstream media, they will face even greater marginalisation and become a casualty of a geoblocking ban if not protected bya continued exemption. What incentive will distribution platforms have to support the smaller European languages – could film and TV soon be predominantly in English, with dubbing? Audiences in smaller nations would miss out on linguistic diversity or simply film and TV content in their own language. Without geo-enabling, the EU would ironically be creating an environment where small-language cinema becomes an endangered species.

Maintaining geo-blocking for copyrighted works and protected subject matter is one of the major tools for guaranteeing cultural diversity.”

 Free-Flow Favours Bigger Players

Without geo-enabling, only bigger players would have the resources to create a pan-European market demand

Beyond cultural concerns, there are economics which create the conditions for investment in films that sustain European cinema. Currently film distributors negotiate region- or country-specific future distribution rights which in turn contribute to funding productions – release schedules for a film may depend on a range of factors, based on local demand, events or national holidays. Without geo-enabling, only bigger players would have the resources to create a pan-European market demand. Against such pan-European distribution platforms, national film industries will struggle to be included and to reach both national and non-national audiences. Ultimately the EU economy would suffer the losses.

“The inclusion of audio-visual services in the scope of the Geo-blocking Regulation would result in a significant loss of revenue, putting investment in new content at risk, while eroding contractual freedom and reducing cultural diversity in content production, distribution promotion and exhibition; emphasises that such an inclusion would result in fewer distribution channels, ultimately driving up prices for consumers.”

Digital Rights Should Strengthen Culture, Not Undermine It

Instead of dismantling a system that allows for localised storytelling and bespoke localized marketing/creation of demand for non-national films and tv content, the EU should invest in infrastructure that expands access while preserving market structures that sustain diverse content.

If the EU is serious about growth, it should be strengthening national film industries.

Revisiting the exemption from the ban on unjustified geo-enabling will create a cultural blandness, vanilla content and undermine creativity with a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach production, marketing and distribution.

It would create a monopolised media landscape dominated by a handful of large players focused on shareholders return and not the audience.

If the EU is serious about growth, it should be strengthening national film industries, not paving the way for their demise!

Rodrigo’s brilliant cartoon with the hollow TV and the viewers as national stereotypes is a cautionary tale. Perhaps this can also be an answer to the consultation?

Busting Fake News Like a Crazy Cat Lady

Monday, September 22nd, 2025

No shortage of disinformation, trolling, propaganda, fake news… whichever term you prefer. Some of it is just brain rot material; some of it is brought by an actor with an agenda. How can anyone navigate it?

One novel approach is to take the role of the instigator. How would you go about spreading dissent and blocking progress? The game Cat Park does precisely this. Your city plans to build a park just for cats. Your job is to stop that. With polarising rhetoric, memes, manipulated images, emotional headlines and other tricks, you can succeed in blocking the decision process and stop the cat park!

It is very difficult to decide what an audience takes a way from any media. Every reader reads the book in their own way. Moviegoers have different experiences from the same film. You may not like my favourite song. Games are no different, so this is why there is a teacher toolkit. Think of this game as part of what a teacher can bring to their students, and it makes more sense.

Has Cat Park the game helped build resistance against disinformation? Yes, very likely in every player. However, in a plot twist, the US Department of State cut the funding for the project earlier this year. (There is a pun here that Doges don’t like cats, but such jokes are beneath me).

The game and toolkit are still around online, waiting for the next crazy cat lady to step in and save democracy (or ruin it?). Perhaps we could all use a counter-psyops toolkit these days?

The truth has whiskers…

Xanadu – The Internet Did Not Have to be Like This

Monday, August 11th, 2025

Xanadu was the home and base for comic book character Mandrake the Magician. It was Kublai Khan’s capital in the Mongol empire. Coleridge wrote of it as a paradise of sorts.

For Netopia, however, a different vision of Xanadu is more interesting. What if the problems we struggle with in today’s internet could have been avoided? No fake news. No trolling. No content theft. No flame wars. No phishing. Sound to good to be true? Maybe it is but bear with me.

Ted Nelson (b 1937) is a digital pioneer from the early days of electronic communication. He coined the term hypertext (you know… clickable links – the core of how we navigate the internet). And he designed a system for how information could be accessed and organized with this concept. The name? You guessed it: Xanadu

 In the Xanadu project, the hypertext is guided by 17 rules – such as:

  • 3 Each user is securely and uniquely identified (=no trolls)
  • 9 Every document can contain a royalty mechanism at any desired degree of granularity to ensure payment on any portion accessed, including virtual copies (“transclusions”) of all or part of the document. (=no copyright theft)
  • 10 Every document is uniquely and securely identified (= no unauthorized copies, no fake news)

… not only did Ted Nelson anticipate many of the problem’s with today’s internet, he also worked solutions to the into the Xanadu design.

But the real game-changer is rule number 7:

Links are visible and can be followed from all endpoints.

Many of the ideas from Xanadu were realised on a grander scale as the World Wide Web. But www-links are one-way only! Ted Nelson’s comment:

HTML is precisely what we were trying to PREVENT– ever-breaking links, links going outward only, quotes you can’t follow to their origins, no version management, no rights management.

Netopia’s favourite thinker Jaron Lanier explains (from Who Owns the Future [2013]):

It’s a small simple change in how online information should be stored that couldn’t have vaster implications for culture and the economy

Maybe in a parallel universe, Xanadu is what World Wide Web is in ours. Or maybe Xanadu was just too complex and simpler systems prevailed. Regardless, when somebody pretends the problems of today’s internet are complete surprises or inevitable side effects of technology – remember that Ted Nelson predicted them all in the 1960s. Perhaps some could use a reminder?

Beyond the Digital Ambulance: The Evolving Economy of Exploitation in the Online World

Monday, July 28th, 2025

In our previous article in 2013, we explored in the first “Digital Ambulance Chasers” study how early opportunists emerged in the digital world to exploit technical loopholes, policy gaps, and user missteps—from DMCA scammers to reputation management firms. These individuals and entities—dubbed “digital ambulance chasers”—profit not by building or creating, but by circling digital misfortune like vultures.

They profit not by building or creating, but by circling digital misfortune like vultures

In this follow-up, we examine a new set of emerging behaviours and monetised schemes that go beyond the obvious. These are not mere scams or overtly criminal actions, but grey-zone tactics—often legally permissible, occasionally sanctioned, and always profitable. Together, they reflect the maturation of an informal industry built not on innovation, but on extraction.

App Store Name Squatting
The Race to Register Before You Launch

Just as domain names became hotly contested real estate in the early days of the web, the names of mobile applications are now being claimed and hoarded. Individuals and groups identify potential trends or copycat known brands, pre-registering app names on platforms like the Apple App Store or Google Play.

In some cases, these names are linked to low-effort apps with minimal functionality, designed to generate ad revenue or harvest user data. In others, the name is simply held and offered for sale to the rightful or intended owner. This tactic mirrors domain squatting but with a more immediate business impact: developers can be forced into lengthy legal disputes or expensive buy-backs simply to preserve their branding.

Early App Store policies  allowed for this kind of name hoarding. While Apple eventually cracked down on the practice—requiring uploaded binaries to maintain name claims—the enforcement remains inconsistent.

Influencer Dispute Monetisation
Turning Online Conflict Into Commercial Strategy

As digital personalities wield increasing social and commercial influence, interpersonal conflicts between them have become more than drama—they’re monetisable events. Agencies and consultants now offer dispute management services tailored specifically to influencers and content creators. These range from copyright strike services to the orchestration of PR battles designed to boost engagement.

A YouTube feud or a Twitter spat was a reputational risk, it is now a business opportunity

Where once a YouTube feud or a Twitter spat was a reputational risk, it is now a business opportunity. Some parties even use legal channels—such as takedown notices or brand defamation claims—as a first step in content strategy.

Class actions and dispute PR have become structured tools in influencer marketing. The broader academic framing is covered in the esteemed German Law Journal, where the “influencer republic” dynamic is detailed. Regulatory attention has also increased, as shown in this analysis.

Data Breach Notification Consultants
Crisis Management or Cash Grab?

For companies that suffer a data breach, the regulatory and reputational fallout is immediate and severe. In this vulnerable window, consultants emerge offering assistance with breach notifications, media communications, and regulatory filings.

While many of these firms provide legitimate crisis response services, others exploit the urgency of the situation to overcharge or upsell unnecessary cybersecurity products. Their tactics often rely on fear: exaggerated interpretations of legal exposure, or veiled threats of further reputational damage if a contract is not signed quickly.

There are many cases where consultants delay disclosure to reduce client liability. Legal observers warn of pressure sales and overreach. An example these firms often act as both emergency responders and sales arms.

Terms of Service Enforcement-as-a-Service
Private Policing with a Paywall

Several online services now offer automated monitoring and enforcement of platform terms—such as detecting fake reviews, brand misuse, or intellectual property violations. These services are marketed as compliance tools but can easily turn into forms of coercion.

They operate much like private enforcement arms—scanning, reporting, and escalating issues unless payment is rendered to ‘clean up’ infractions

In some cases, these firms contact businesses they believe are in technical violation of a platform’s terms and offer “resolution services” in exchange for a monthly fee. They operate much like private enforcement arms—scanning, reporting, and escalating issues unless payment is rendered to “clean up” infractions.

This dynamic raises ethical and legal questions about due process, as enforcement actions traditionally governed by platforms or regulators become outsourced and monetised by third parties.

A New Class of Middlemen
What emerges across these practices is a clear pattern: a growing class of digital intermediaries who position themselves not to solve problems, but to own them. From squatting on names to profiting from influencer disputes, they offer assistance with one hand while subtly charging for air with the other.

In this economy, the most valuable skill is not creation—but opportunistic timing

The internet, once lauded as a decentralised meritocracy, has now matured into a layered economy where visibility, access, and even compliance can be bought, sold, or blocked. And as long as regulatory gaps and digital uncertainty persist, so too will those who thrive in their shadow.

If the first wave of digital ambulance chasers profited from technical ignorance, the next wave profits from systemic complexity. In this economy, the most valuable skill is not creation—but opportunistic timing.

Machine Usefulness – A Compass for Navigating the AI Revolution

Tuesday, May 13th, 2025

Book Review of Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson

Innovation lays the groundwork for the redistribution of power and wealth. In the Middle Ages, elites used water and windmills to extract wealth from the people to build cathedrals. Today, with AI, we are on the same path – unless we get up for “machine usefulness”.

Innovation lays the groundwork for the redistribution of power and wealth.

Innovation. Nothing can be wrong with that. Can it? Innovation brings us better products, leaner processes, and greener technology. We all benefit. We have better lives. This has always been the case for humanity throughout history, whenever innovation has entered the scene. Innovation is what we need to solve our problems. This applies even more to the latest and most significant innovation of our time, which is now taking off: artificial intelligence.

But what if this common narrative is simply wrong? That’s the argument made by economists Daron Acemoglu, Nobel Prize laureate in 2024, and Simon Johnson in their recent book Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (2024).

Technology often redistributes prosperity away from ordinary people.

In an unusual move for economists, Acemoglu and Johnson take a deep dive into economic history to support their argument. As a result, their book is full of stories rather than models and statistics, making it an engaging read. The historical examples they provide vividly illustrate what happens when technology “redistributes power and prosperity away from ordinary people”. This is exactly what happened when water and windmills were introduced in the Middle Ages. Instead of enabling a better life for all those involved in production and consumption, the surplus created by the new technology was largely absorbed by the religious hierarchy. Cathedrals, monasteries, churches—that’s where much of the profit ended up.

Mills are just one of many cases Acemoglu and Johnson cite to make their point. Looms and coal mining are other examples. Looking at the broader picture, hardly any progress for ordinary people is discernible. “The quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or even seven thousand years earlier,” they write. “According to the best available estimates, GDP per capita (in real, price-adjusted terms) was almost the same in 1000 CE as it had been a thousand years earlier.”

But there are exceptions. And this brings us to the brighter outlook that Power and Progress points to. Whether innovation and technological change benefit the general population or just those in power is a matter of choice—both political and technological. These choices are ours to make or enforce. “Machine usefulness” is the term Acemoglu and Johnson propose for a kind of innovation that benefits society and ordinary people.

Machine usefulness means innovation that benefits society, not just elites.

Again, history provides useful examples. Electricity, for instance, embodies the kind of “usefulness” they advocate, as it allowed for diverse applications and development paths. Another example is how the American automobile industry handled automation in the postwar period. Instead of merely cutting costs, technology was used to create new tasks and jobs for workers of all skill levels.

“Managers and engineers could have chosen to double down on automation as a method to cut costs in existing industries. Instead, they […] pushed to build new systems and machinery […], augmenting the capabilities of both skilled and unskilled labour.” This led to an increase in demand for workers in the industry, “which more than made up for declining labour intensity in agriculture and some manufacturing tasks.” All of this is well-documented in recent research on economic history.

Some digital technologies also exhibit traits of “machine usefulness”. Acemoglu and Johnson highlight famous single innovations like the computer mouse, as well as broader advancements such as virtual reality and digital tools that support work in education and healthcare. Steve Jobs referred to such tools as a “bicycle for the mind”. Other examples mentioned in the book include new platforms that connect people with different skills and needs or tools that improve classroom instruction by enabling personalised learning.

AI continues this trend: disrupting labour markets, shifting power to those who control

Overall, however, the introduction of digital technologies marks a turning point—one that contrasts with the shared prosperity model associated with the automobile industry. “Wage growth slowed down, the labour share of national income declined sharply, and wage inequality surged starting around 1980.” AI continues this trend: disrupting labour markets, shifting power to those who control data and make key corporate decisions, impoverishing billions in the global south, reinforcing existing biases (such as those based on skin colour), and even undermining institutions. That’s the dark picture Power and Progress paints.

AI, Acemoglu and Johnson point out, enables “so-so automation”. AI replaces humans, but often without creating new opportunities—just leading to lower service quality. “So-so automation” occurs when stores install self-checkout kiosks that don’t improve customer service or when AI takes over customer support:

“Humans are then brought in as troubleshooters after a long series of menus. By this point, the customer is often frustrated, early opportunities for building a social bond have been lost, and the customer service representative lacks the same depth of communication, limiting their ability to learn from and adapt to specific circumstances. This makes the representative less effective and may encourage managers and technologists to find further ways to reduce their tasks.”

That’s a perfect vicious cycle.

So, what’s our task? The direction that innovation in general—and AI in particular—is taking must be brought under democratic control:

“When a company decides to develop facial recognition technology or track faces in a crowd… their engineers are best placed to decide how to design the software. But society at large should have a voice in whether such software should be developed and deployed.”

Another example: rules for social media platforms that go far beyond the relatively weak measures discussed recently:

“Even with much better monitoring, it would be unrealistic to expect that Facebook can eliminate all posts containing misinformation or hate speech. Yet it is not too much to expect that their algorithms should not amplify such material by boosting it and actively recommending it to other users.”

Will innovation automate work or create new tasks? Will it be used for surveillance or to empower workers? Will it influence political discourse and social outcomes for better or worse? These are the key questions that determine whether a technology exhibits “machine usefulness”. What we need is the right institutional framework and government policies to steer the private sector away from excessive automation and surveillance and toward technologies that serve the broader public interest.

Whether innovation serves the public is a political and technological choice.

Here’s one idea for such a framework: let’s make the direction of technological development a key criterion for investors when evaluating companies. Large investors could demand transparency on whether new technologies align with societal needs.

Last but not least: narratives matter. It is persuasion—not mere physical force—that has historically paved the way for innovation. And the ability to persuade is deeply tied to social status and political power. The tech elite, today’s global oligarchy, have successfully convinced us of their narrative about AI’s exponentially increasing capabilities. Power and Progress offers a counter-narrative. Let’s spread the word!

 

I Have Not Been Manipulated by Algorithms, but You Have

Monday, April 21st, 2025

Giuliano da Empoli is a Swiss-Italian novelist, political essayist, and professor at Paris’s Sciences Po. He writes about how political forces rise to power and how manipulation of public discourse happens. And he has a message for you: you are being manipulated by algorithms. We are being manipulated by algorithms.

Read the headline of this post again: I Have Not Been Manipulated by Algorithms, but You Have.

Doesn’t sound right, does it? Those being manipulated are always somebody else. They. You. Never we or I. So the first step is to accept that I, too, am being manipulated. When we accept that, we can start thinking about what to do about it.

I am being manipulated by algorithms. My taste in music. My knowledge about the world. My understanding of how the world works. This is not a conspiracy theory—I am not being singled out and fed something specific to move in some certain direction. It’s just that the way the online world works—the algorithms it runs on—will bring me some sorts of information and not other sorts of information.

What do I do with this insight? First, I will stop pointing fingers and doing algo-shaming on others. Next, I will make more efforts to seek information outside of online sources. I’ll tell you when I find something—watch this space.

You don’t have to do anything, because surely you see through the algorithms. Or do you?

The Key to European Competitiveness?

Wednesday, April 16th, 2025

When Mario Draghi defined the future of European competitiveness, no one expected the results to be treated like sacred scripture—open to interpretation, debated in hushed conference rooms, and occasionally quoted as if it came with divine footnotes. And yet, here we are!

The Draghi Report has landed, and while some see it as a roadmap to economic revival, others seem to be using it to justify investments in… Formula 1? As our cartoonist cheekily puts it, interpreting Draghi’s recommendations is now a spiritual journey—complete with misunderstandings, contradictions, and the occasional ban on crustaceans.

Welcome to the holy grail of European economic discourse.

The Key to European Competitiveness?

The Trilemma of European Big Tech Regulation

Wednesday, April 9th, 2025

Book review: Werner Stengg, Digital Policy in the EU. Towards a Human-Centred Digital Transformation

It is unusual to read an EU Commission insider’s writing on recent and current topics of legislation. Werner Stengg’s book Digital Policy in the EU is one of those unusual comments. Netopia invited a former Commission insider – Detlef Eckert – to review it.

Werner Stengg’s book Digital Policy in the EU. Towards a Human-Centred Digital Transformation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2024) addresses the EU’s response to the challenges posed by digital transformation. While it focuses predominantly on regulation, it also explores broader policy aspects.

Technology should serve people, not just businesses — a human-centred digital transformation

The subtitle reflects the EU’s perspective on technological disruption, emphasising the wish for technology to serve people rather than solely businesses. This aligns with the EU’s characteristic approach of pursuing three simultaneous objectives: social (human-centric), sustainability (climate), and competitiveness. Balancing these ambitions has always been challenging.

The increasing societal impact of social media, coupled with Meta’s recent scale-back of content moderation following similar actions by Twitter/X, makes Werner Stengg’s book particularly timely. While the book delves into various aspects of digital regulation, its analysis of Big Tech and social media regulation is especially compelling.

As an active EU official and a key figure within the Commission’s digital policy teams, Werner Stengg offers an insider’s perspective. Readers can expect a well-researched and meticulously drafted account of policy developments, providing valuable insight into how the Commission perceives digital technologies and the rationale behind its regulatory interventions.

The book’s stated aim is “to capture the digital transformation, as well as Europe’s policy response to it, in the most holistic way possible.”

SETTING THE SCENE

The author begins his book by examining the digital policy approach of the first von der Leyen Commission, which focused on the dual green-digital transformation. Its slogan, “Europe fit for the digital age,” encapsulated this vision. The text provides an overview of the evolution of the digital space, incorporating historical references and its connections to earlier scientific revolutions. The author briefly traces the development of the Internet, the World Wide Web (Sir Tim Berners-Lee, CERN), search engines, and mobile ecosystems.

Europe invents, the U.S. commercialises — a recurring pattern in tech history.

The chapter places significant emphasis on the platform economy, setting the stage for subsequent chapters by exploring the power of platforms and the regulations aimed at curbing this power. It identifies network effects, lack of transparency, disruption, and negative externalities as the most pressing challenges that require policy responses.

A Note on the Internet’s Evolution

I would like to take this opportunity to add a few comments regarding the evolution of the Internet. First, the Belgian software engineer Robert Cailliau, a colleague of Berners-Lee at CERN, should be recognised as a critical contributor to the project that became the World Wide Web. Second, it is a recurring pattern that technologies developed in Europe are commercialised in the United States.

Robert Cailliau deserves recognition as co-creator of the World Wide Web

For instance, the first commercially successful WWW browser was Netscape’s Navigator, which was pivotal in making eCommerce a reality. Third, the Internet was introduced to Europe on 17 November 1988, when the Dutch Computer Centrum CWI connected to the NSF. Interestingly, the European Commission, for a long time, did not embrace the TCP/IP suite but instead promoted ISO standards. Finally, the role of RIPE, the European IP registrar, in fostering internet adoption across Europe deserves greater recognition and appreciation.

REGULATING INTERNET-BASED SERVICES

In its third chapter, the book examines the first significant regulations aimed at internet services, or, as they are referred to, ‘information society services.’ This somewhat unusual term dates back to the 1990s when the EU’s digital strategy was built around the concept of the Information Society, introduced by Commissioner Martin Bangemann.

The eCommerce Directive stands out as a landmark regulation, establishing the principle of the country of origin for digital services combined with minimal regulatory requirements. Adopted in 2000, the Directive governed digital services for two decades and was considered an enabling framework that unleashed the potential of eCommerce. Its importance lies in its liability provisions for hosting, mere conduit, and caching services. While praised for fostering innovation, the Directive also attracted criticism.

Initially, hosting services were primarily databases and websites, but over time, they evolved into powerful platforms. The Directive aimed to limit “excessive litigation.” However, as the author recalls, critics argued that intermediaries could cause harm to others without being held accountable. Copyright holders were among those raising concerns, alongside those worried about harmful content that was inadequately moderated.

The author revisits these issues later in the book when discussing contemporary challenges and the Digital Services Act (DSA).

PRIVACY CONCERNS

The 1995 Data Protection Directive (which, by the way, took five years of negotiation) served as the cornerstone of privacy regulation in the EU. It formed the basis of the “Safe Harbour” arrangement with the US, later deemed legally insufficient by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

However, the Directive had several shortcomings, which Werner Stengg explains in detail and which the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) addressed. For example, the GDPR clarified the definition of private data, outlined what constitutes valid consent, and provided a more comprehensive legal framework for data processing.

“Data processing must be lawful, fair, and transparent,” Stengg writes, highlighting the GDPR’s foundational principles. He elaborates on the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation, raising essential questions about how these principles can be upheld in big data and artificial intelligence.

CONSUMER PROTECTION

In the context of eCommerce and digital services, the Commission has consistently regarded consumers as the weaker party needing protection. As the narrative explains, the Commission also recognised the importance of ensuring consumer trust in these new services to enable their adoption and growth.

Thus, consumer protection—much like privacy protection—has always been viewed as a means of safeguarding consumers and facilitating the development of digital services. This sub-chapter introduces various Directives and initiatives, providing detailed explanations of their provisions.

ALGORITHMS

Up to this point, the book has focused primarily on the consumer side. However, as the platform players’ market power increased, the focus shifted to competition policy. This shift began with several landmark competition cases and extended to the Platform-to-Business (B2B) Regulation, which aimed to address unfair competition. An informed reader will recognise that this development ultimately led to the Digital Markets Act (DMA), with a preparatory analysis presented in Chapter 4.

“The paradigm shift in European policymaking was the recognition that continued reliance on market forces alone would not solve any of the problems identified.” (p. 109)

Continued reliance on market forces alone won’t solve digital economy challenges.

In exploring these issues, the narrative revisits the earlier discussion of the platform economy, delving into market power, misaligned interests (negative externalities), information asymmetries, and unhealthy global dependencies. The author conducts a market failure analysis by examining the impact of the platform economy’s characteristics on markets. This offers valuable insight into how regulators perceive markets and rationalise regulation and market intervention.

Algorithm opacity is one of the Commission’s key concerns.

That said, the book could also have considered policy failure. Issues such as a lack of foresight, tendencies toward over-bureaucratisation, and slow responses to align regulation with dynamic market changes.

At this stage, the book clarifies that algorithm opacity is one of the Commission’s key concerns. These algorithms effectively govern how platforms operate, and their lack of transparency poses significant challenges for regulators.

TARGETS OF REGULATION

This section of the book helps the reader understand various regulatory approaches by distinguishing three partly overlapping characteristics.

First, specific regulations can be identified by their target services, such as video-sharing platforms or online marketplaces. Readers might be surprised to learn that several regulations were already in place even before the DSA and DMA were enacted.

Second, not every market player is subject to the same level of regulation. Typically, smaller companies benefit from exemptions or are regulated less. The book notes, “Therefore, it seems justified – and more proportionate – to request higher levels of due diligence from such large operators.” This distinction is evident in the DSA’s focus on “very large online platforms” and the DMA’s regulation of “gatekeepers” and “core platform services.”

Third, regulation can target specific technologies. While the EU traditionally follows a principle of technology neutrality, this approach appears to be shifting in certain policy areas, such as the Green Deal. The author refers to ‘data technology’ as an example of this focus. Another key example is artificial intelligence, which the AI Act addresses.

REGULATING DIGITAL MARKETS

After outlining various policy concepts related to the digital decade in Chapter 6, the narrative moves to the core of the book, focusing on the most recent legislative initiatives, starting with the Digital Markets Act (DMA).

 “…the new digital monopolies (or oligopolies) were the result of the free play of market forces: …”.

The central issue addressed is the weak contestability of specific digital markets. One earlier attempt to address this was the Platform-to-Business Regulation, which aimed to enhance transparency but ultimately fell short of making digital markets fair and contestable.

The author identifies five factors that contribute to market contestability: ease of market entry, access to market information, absence of self-preferencing, avoidance of lock-in situations, and limiting the leveraging of market power into adjacent markets. The DMA directly addresses these concerns, which the author analyses before moving on to the Digital Services Act (DSA).

For some, the DSA is too weak; for others, it goes too far, curtailing free speech. The book offers a balanced perspective, helping to rationalise the debate by clarifying what the DSA

The author turns to the DSA to explain how it distinguishes between social media platforms and eCommerce marketplaces. While the liability regime remains unchanged, the DSA introduces day-to-day responsibilities and due diligence requirements. It defines the processes that intermediaries or platforms must follow to mitigate risks.

Chapter 8 takes on a more political topic: democracy and social media. The chapter reveals how Elon Musk’s decision to reduce or even remove content moderation on X has struck a nerve with EU policymakers. The book illustrates their unease about these developments, which is evident in recent European statements regarding Musk’s actions. For some, the DSA is too weak; for others, it goes too far, curtailing free speech. The book offers a balanced perspective, helping to rationalise the debate by clarifying what the DSA does and does not address. Beneficial are the two summarised sections outlining the key aspects of the DSA.

THE BROADER REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

In Chapter 9, Werner Stengg introduces the reader to several initiatives, including those related to data governance, cybersecurity, the Chips Act, and, most notably, artificial intelligence (AI). This provides an overview of the broad range of regulations and initiatives impacting various aspects of the digital economy. AI has become a politically charged topic, and the book explains the rationale behind the AI Act. It also covers the various political discussions and formats, such as the G7, that have taken place.

Given the rapid advancements in generative AI (foundation models), the onset of the Trump administration, and the substantial investments announced in the US and China, the European response appears cautious (despite strong political statements and recent announcements). It will be fascinating to revisit this topic in a few years to see how market realities have unfolded compared to the current discussions.

CONCLUSIONS

Is Europe fit for the digital age?

Werner Stengg’s book comprehensively explores the EU’s digital policy, shedding light on the motivations and challenges underlying its regulatory framework. The author ultimately leaves readers with the question: Is Europe fit for the digital age? This question is accompanied by ten key takeaways encapsulating the book’s insights. I conclude this review by inviting readers to delve into these takeaways for themselves and explore Stengg’s analysis.

Postcard from Geneva (or: Keeping up with the Americans)

Sunday, March 23rd, 2025

Earlier this year, I visited Geneva. More importantly, I visited CERN; the particle physics laboratory. It is a very impressive and welcoming place; go if you can. On the French border, there is a 27 km long tunnel in the form of a circle, a particle accelerator named the Large Hadron Collider (hadrons are components of atoms: protons and neutrons, but not electrons). Full of fun facts, the temperature is -271.3°C, which is colder than outer space. This is because the electromagnets powering the accelerator are superconductors at this temperature. The particles reach 0.999999991 times the speed of light. And so on… you get the picture (don’t tell me you’re not fascinated!).

I said welcoming: there is an exhibition covering five expo halls, where scientists working on real experiments hang about, keen to explain and answer questions. There is a guided tour that takes visitors into some of the labs and control rooms. And everything is free, a short tram ride from Geneva Central Station (the trams are free too, with a voucher from your hotel). In fact, this is the spirit of the whole lab: it is paid for by the participating states. Only they can conduct experiments, but the results are freely available to all of humanity.

I was interested in the history of the facility, and it turns out it started in the 1950s when Europe was lamenting the loss of all those prominent physicists that moved to America during WWII. How should Europe keep up with America? The answer was to build the biggest particle accelerator in the world.

Has anything useful come from this particle physics laboratory? you ask. Well, the anti-matter factory has only produced enough anti-matter to heat a cup of tea since its inception in 2000. But the crystals used to capture the particles from the hadron collisions are used in medicine to diagnose cancer. So that saves lives. But the most famous invention from CERN came from the document management system: the World Wide Web, invented by Sir Tim Berners-Lee at CERN in 1989.* Now… who has made the most money from the World Wide Web?

You decide what the moral of this story ought to be. All I know is that particle physics are cool. Superconducting cool.

So cool that the computer that ran the first www-server is on display at the CERN expo, and it is a NeXT – that’s the computer that Steve Jobs designed in order to get his job back at Apple.